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Austin: Austin: Punitive Damages in Negligence Cases

Punitive Damages in Negligence Cases: The
Conflicting Standards
Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative,Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Missouri, punitive damages are awarded for the purpose of inflicting
punishment for wrongdoing, and are intended to serve as an example and
deterrent to similar conduct.2 They are distinguished from actual damages,
which are awarded to compensate for actual injuries or loss sustained
While prevalent in intentional torts because of malice,4 Missouri also
allows, under certain circumstances, punitive damages to be awarded in
negligence cases.' The issue then becomes identification of those certain
circumstances. This Note will examine the reasoning and the specific fact
situations which have supported punitive damages in negligence cases and then
compare the decision in Haynam to this case law.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative, Inc. [Haynam I]
Haynam I was an action brought against an electric utility alleging
wrongful termination of service and seeking actual and punitive damages.'
The Haynams owned and operated a dairy farm and were members of the
Laclede Electric Cooperative.' The Haynams read their own meter each
month, and based upon that reading, were billed by Laclede.8 In March
1986, Frank Haynam did the reading and, as required, reported it to Laclede.9
According to that reading, the Haynam's electric usage for the month was
13,299 kilowatt hours, an increase of six times their normal usage."l Frank
Haynam contacted James Snavely, the area foreman for Laclede, about this
1.
2.
3.
4.

1994 WL 96608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Mo. 1968).
Id.
See, e.g., Sanders v. Daniel International Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1984).
5. See, e.g., Reel v. Consolidated Inv. Co., 236 S.W. 43 (Mo. 1921).
6. Haynam v. Laclede Elec. Coop., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1992).
7. Id. at 202.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. This naturally resulted in an unusually large bill.
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increased usage,11 whereupon Snavely visited the Haynam farm. Although
Snavely did not test the meter, he reported that he found nothing wrong with
it, and suggested the usage could be due to an electrical surge."l Upon
Snavely's recommendation, the Haynams hired an electrician to inspect their
appliances, but his inspection failed to disclose any defects. 3
The Haynams protested the large bill, but Laclede refused to reduce the
charges. Laclede claimed it was the Haynams' fraudulent reading of the meter
during the previous year.14
In order to continue electrical service, the Haynams agreed to pay the
bill, but made special arrangements with Laclede concerning the timing of the
payments.1 Sondra Haynam testified that Laclede agreed to allow them to
pay one half in April 1986, and the other half by May 30, 1986.16 However,
Laclede's account manager recorded that the final payment would be due on
May 16, 1986.17 In addition, the Haynams testified that they were told by
several officials of Laclede, including Snavely and general manager Kenneth
Miller, that the electricity would not be disconnected without a personal visit
from Laclede. 8
On May 22, 1986, Laclede terminated electrical service1 " Miller
testified that he authorized the disconnection of service without notice to the
Haynams.2 ° Reluctantly, the Haynams agreed to pay all reconnection fees,
an additional security deposit, as well as the amount due on the bill.21

The Haynams plead their cause of action for actual damages based upon

intentional conduct that was "malicious, wanton and willful." '22 After a jury
award to the Haynams for damages, the trial court granted Laclede's motion
for a new trial.' The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District
set aside the order and remanded the case for entry of a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Laclede.24 The Court of Appeals

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 202-03.
18. Id. at 203.
19. Id. A Laclede agent left a note that said, "When you pay your bill we will
bring your meter back." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 204.
23. Id. at 200.
24. Id. at 202.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/6
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found that the Haynams did not present sufficient evidence to conclude that
Laclede's termination of services was malicious, willful or wanton.'
The Haynams appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. The court held
that in the absence of a contrary provision in a contract, a plaintiff seeking
recoveryin tort for wrongful termination of electrical services need only show
that defendant acted negligently in its failure to supply electrical service.26
The court affirmed the trial court and remanded for a new trial.' However,
in remanding, the court suggested that the Haynams could submit their claim
for actual damages based upon a negligence theory."
In the same opinion, the Supreme Court also reviewed the trial court's
award of punitive damages. In view of evidence that the remainder of the bill
was not due until the end of the month with Laclede being aware of this,29
the court found "the Haynams made a submissible 30case on the standard of
conduct necessary to award punitive damages .... "
B. Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative,Inc. [Haynam II]
On retrial, the Haynams followed the Supreme Court's suggestion and
31
submitted their case for actual damages based on a negligence theory.
Again, the harm alleged was pecuniary and included the disputed charges for
electrical service, disconnection and reconnection fees, and an additional
security deposit.3 2 The jury found for the Haynams awarding actual damages

and $50,000 in punitive damages. 3 Laclede appealed, challenging, among
other points, the punitive damages award. 4 There was no significant change
in the facts or the evidence; therefore, Laclede's "state of mind" and its
alleged conduct was essentially the same at the second trial as was before the
Supreme Court in Haynam L" As Judge Parrish noted in his concurring
opinion in Haynam H, "since the [S]upreme [C]ourt held, in Haynam I, that
the evidence supported punitive damages when the underlying cause of action
was based on an intentional tort, logic dictates that the same evidence will

25. Id.
26. Id. at 203-04.
27. The Court found reversible error in the admission of evidence of the
plaintiffs' reputation, an issue not germane to this casenote.

28. Haynmn, 827 S.W.2d at 204.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 205.
Id.
Haynmn, 1994 WL 96608, at *1.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *10.
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support punitive damages when the underlying cause of action is based on
negligence. 36
Thus, the Southern District affirmed the trial court concluding, as did the
Supreme Court in Haynam I, that the Haynams presented sufficient evidence
to merit punitive damages.37
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Punitive Damages in General
In order to effectively understand the present status of punitive or
exemplary damages as they pertain to negligence cases in Missouri, a brief
examination of the history of punitive damages, in general, and the required
mental state is required.
In Goetz v. Ambs,38 the Missouri Supreme Court considered the
imposition of punitive damages but did not award them.39 It was not until
fifteen years later in Klingman v. Holmes4" that the Court first awarded
punitive damages, relying on the justification stated in a prior case
(McKeon).41 The Missouri Supreme Court in McKeon,42 stated: "Such
damages may serve for an example [thus, exemplary damages] to others in
like cases .... "4 3 Thus, while Missouri courts have cited other reasons for
awarding punitive damages,44 the most frequently cited purposes of punitive
punish the wrongdoer and to deter him or her and others from
damages are to
45
like conduct.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *2, *9.
38. 27 Mo. 28 (1858).
39. The court permitted a jury instruction allowing punitive damages if the jury
found the defendant's act wrongful and done intentionally. However, the jury did not
make this finding. Id.
40. 54 Mo. 304 (1873).
41. Id.; See also W. Dudley McCarter & Robert L. Jackstadt, Punitive Damages:
Malice and OtherRecent Developments,43 J. oF Mo. B. 455, 456 (1987).
42. McKeon v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 42 Mo. 79 (1867).
43. Id. at 87.
44. McCarter & Jackstadt, supranote 41, at 456 (citing McKeon, 42 Mo. at 87,
holding that exemplary damages are "around compensationor an adequate recompense
for the injury sustained"); Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Co., 141 S.W. 1095, 1097
(Mo. 1911) (holding that exemplary damages are a "fine which society imposes on the
offender to protect its peculiar interests").
45. Lewis v. Envirotech Corp., 674 S.W.2d 105, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); See
also MISSOURI APPRO ED JURY INSTRUCnTONS 10.01 [1990 Revision] (Stephan H.

Ringkamp ed., 4th ed. 1991).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/6
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To justify the imposition of this punishment on the wrongdoer, there must
be the presence of malice on the part of the wrongdoer. 6 The concept of
malice combines the wrongdoer's state of mind with his or her culpability.'
As one commentator instructed, "When proving malice, one is not proving
whether conduct occurred, rather one is proving what a person was thinking
about when he or she performed that conduct."4
More specifically there must be a certain degree, or type, of malice
present. Historically, Missouri courts only recognized two degrees of
malice. 9 However, since 1984, with the Sanders decision, Missouri law
three degrees of malice: actual malice, legal malice and malice in
recognizes
0
5

law.

While Missouri courts have not fully assimilated Sanders and its degrees
of malice into a unified theory of punitive damages, it can still be stated that
the level of fault or culpability for punitive damages is greater than that
Also, deduced from Sanders'
required for compensatory damages.5
definitions of the degrees of malice, as well as malice defined before Sanders,
is that some degree of knowledge, or scienter, is required. 2
Before considering how Missouri has applied the malice and scienter
requisite for punitive damages in negligence cases, an examination of other
jurisdictions will be helpful for comparison purposes.
Arizona courts maintain that "[p]unitive damages are not allowed for
mere negligence."53 They require a showing of a reckless or wanton
disregard of the rights of others. 4 Punitive damages are not permissible in

46. See Oster v. Kribs Ford, 660 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Herron v.
Wyrick, 686 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
47. Sanders v. Daniel International Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. 1984).

48. John T. Walsh, The Evil That Men Do: Malice and Punitive Damages, 51
Mo. L. REv. 751, 752 (1986).
49. McCarter & Jackstadt, supranote 41, at 457; See, e.g., Oster,660 S.W.2d at
356; Stark v. American Bakeries Co., 647 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. 1983).
50. The court defined actual malice as "ill will, spite, personal hatred, or
vindictive motives," Sanders, 682 S.W.2d at 807; legal malice as "any improper or
wrongful motive," id.; and malice in law as "a wrongful act done intentionally without
just cause or excuse." Id. at 808.
51. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Holcroft v.
Missouri K.T. R.R., 607 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).

52. Actual malice being an attempt to injure shows scienter of the likelihood or
probability that injury will result; legal malice incorporates a wrongful motive or such
egregious conduct that intent will be implied; and malice in law is frankly defined as
a wrongful act done intentionally.
53. Hall v. Motorists Ins. Corp., 509 P.2d 604, 607 (Ariz. 1973).

54. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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a negligence case because the standard required for punitive damages is
equivalent to intentional, wrongful conduct. 5
Similar to Missouri, Florida permits recovery of punitive damages in an
ordinary negligence case;56 however, in further defining the requisite conduct
and intent, its courts have held that there must be a showing of atrocity, gross
and flagrant character, and moral turpitude.57
In Larson v. Massey-Ferguson,58 Iowa permitted recovery of punitive
damages in a case of gross negligence.59 Gross negligence was defined as
something substantially more than ordinary negligence, but falls short,
however, of intending to injure or harm.6" Prior to this case, and similar to
Missouri, Iowa permitted punitive damages in a negligence case while
maintaining no degree of care or of negligence.6"

B. EarlyMissouri Negligence CasesNot Allowing Punitive
Damages
Two lines of case law.emerged in Missouri regarding the permissibility
of awarding punitive damages in negligence cases. The requirement of
scienter for punitive damages was the core issue of variance in the courts.

55. Smithy. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz. 1977).

Inaddition, California courts do not allow punitive damage awards when only
negligence is plead, or found by a jury; mere negligence, even gross negligence, is
not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 706, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). "[A] conscious disregard of the safety of others
may constitute malice" andwill support punitive damages if an intentional tort is plead.
Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 598 P.2d 854, 856 (Cal. 1979).
Similar to California, it is well settled in Arkansas that mere negligence, no
matter how gross, is not sufficient to justify awarding punitive damages. Great
American Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983, 989 (E.D. Ark. 1965). While
intentional or malicious conduct will obviously support punitive damages, a less strict
standard of conduct of a conscious disregard for foreseeable injuries will also support
punitive damages. Id. Like California, the tort that is pled makes the difference.
56. Richards Co., Inc. v. Harrison, 262 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that "[p]unitive damages need not flow from an intentional course of conduct
or intent to inflict damages but may also be allowed in such where there is that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to the
consequences of one's action or inaction").
57. Jacksonville Frosted Foods, Inc. v. Haigler, 224 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Ct.

App. 1969).
58. 328 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).

59. Id. at 346.
60. Id. at 345.

61. Hendricks v. Broderick, 284 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Iowa 1979).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/6
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One line of case law would not allow the awarding of punitive damages,
holding that negligence results in an unintentional injury.62 These courts
noted that while negligence is generally predicated upon failure to employ a
prescribed standard of care, willful, wanton or malicious injury is the result
of another kind of tort which is the intentional doing of an act in utter
disregard of the consequences.63
There is a clear distinction between unintentional injury due to
negligence, and injury, actually or impliedly intentional, due to willful, wanton
or reckless conduct.'
"Negligence, by its nature, implies wrongful
inadvertence. Willful, wanton and reckless' conduct connotes some degree of
'
wrongful, conscious intent."65
Thus, an act cannot be both negligent and
66
intentional at the same time. Since an act is not willful, wanton or reckless
where there is mere failure to exercise the due degree of care, then something
more than negligence must be shown to warrant the imposition of punitive
damages.67 It follows that since there are no degrees of negligence
recognized in Missouri," the conclusion is that willful, wanton and reckless
conduct is one tort, while negligence is another-hence, the difference is one
not of degree but of kind.69 It follows that a plaintiff's harm was either (1)
the tort of negligence or (2) the tort of willful, wanton or malicious
misconduct, but it can not have been both at the same time. °

C. Early MissouriNegligence Cases Allowing Punitive Damages
Concurrently, a line of cases in Missouri did allow punitive damages
when the plaintiff alleged only negligence. These courts reiterated the
62. Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Greene v.
Morse, 375 S.W.2d 411, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Voss v. American Mutual Liab.
Ins. Co., 341 S.W.2d 270, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
63. Ervin, 454 S.W.2d at 291; Greene, 375 S.W.2d at 411; Voss, 341 S.W.2d at
270.
64. See Ervin, 454 S.W.2d at 291; Warner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 428
S.W.2d 596, 603 (Mo. 1968); Cosentino v. Heffelfmger, 229 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Mo.
1950).
65. Harzfeld's Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 116 F. Supp. 512,515 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
66. O'Brien v. St. Louis Transit Co., 110 S.W. 705, 707 (Mo. 1908); Raming v.
Metro. St. Ry. Co., 57 S.W. 268, 273 (Mo. 1900).
67. Harzfeld'sInc., 116 F. Supp. at 514.
68. Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 S.W. 904, 906 (Mo. 1896); Ramel v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 187 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945); Cummingv.
Allied Hotel Corp., 144 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940); Reeves v. Lutz, 162
S.W. 280, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914).
69. Harzfeld's, 116 F. Supp. at 514.
70. Ervin, 454 S.W.2d at 291.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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proposition that in order to justify the infliction of punitive damages, the act
complained of must have been done wantonly or maliciously.7 However,
they found that malice could be attributed to a negligent defendant. The
seminal case, Reel v. ConsolidatedInv. Co.,72 explained:
But an act or omission, though properly characterized as negligent, may
manifest such reckless indifference to the rights of others that the law will
imply that an injury resulting from it was intentionally inflicted
• . . [o]r, there may be conscious negligence tantamount to intentional
wrongdoing, as where the person doing the act or failing to act must be
conscious of his conduct, and, though having no specific intent to injure,
must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and
existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally or probably result in
injury. In either case punitive damages are allowable for the resulting

injury."
These courts admitted that negligent acts and wanton acts are
distinguishable but nevertheless failed to find them necessarily repugnant to
one another 4 because wanton and reckless conduct does not amount, in law,
to intentional conduct.75
D. Convergence at Sharp, and Its Ensuing Application
In Sharp v. Robberson,76 the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the

convergent views of the admissibility of punitive damages instructions in a
negligence case. Defendant cited Ervin and its line of cases arguing that
negligence and punitive damages instructions are incompatible and disprove
one another.77 The court distinguished Ervin from the case at hand. The
Court noted that in Ervin the punitive damages instruction submitted the issue
on the premise that defendant's conduct was willful, wanton or malicious,

71. See, e.g., Reel v. Consolidated Inv. Co., 236 S.W. 43, 46 (Mo. 1921);
McKenzie v. Randolph, 257 S.W. 126, 127 (Mo. 1923); Eoff v. Senter, 317 S.W.2d
666, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Zemlick v. A.B.C. Auto Sales & Investment Co., 60
S.W.2d 649, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933); Masonv. Kum, 145 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. Ct.

App. 1940); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
72. 236 S.W. 43 (Mo. 1921).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Eoff, 317 S.W.2d at 670.
Crull,382 S.W.2d at 21.
495 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1973).
Id. at 396.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/6

8

Austin: Austin: Punitive Damages in Negligence Cases

1995]

PUAT= DAMAGES iN NEGLIGENCE CASES

In Sharp, however, punitive damages were
which is MAI No. 10.01.7
submitted on MAI No. 10.027- under the premise that defendant's conduct
showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of
80
others.
The Sharp court, citing Reel,"' stated that the submission of a punitive
damages instruction without a finding that defendant intended to injure
plaintiff did not require that plaintiff's actual damages be premised on conduct
which would authorize punitive damages.' A plaintiff may obtain actual

78. "[I]f you believe the conduct of defendant as submitted in Instruction Number
(here insert number of plaintiffs verdict directing instruction) was willful,
wanton or malicious because of defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to the
rights of others, then in addition to any damages to which you find plaintiff entitled
... you may award plaintiff an additional amount as punitive damages ...."
MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10.01 (James W. Jeans ed., 2d ed. 1969).
79. "Ifyou find the issues in favor of plaintiff, and if you believe the conduct of
(here insert the number of
defendant as submitted under Instruction Number _
plaintiffs verdictdirectinginstruction)showed complete indifference to or conscious
disregard for the safety of others, then.., you may award plaintiff an additional
amount as punitive damages.... " MiSSOUI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10.02
(James W. Jeans ed., 2d ed. 1969).
MAI 10.07 was drafted in response to Menaughv. Resler Optometry, Inc., 799
S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1990), and is a modification of MAI 10.02.
(here
If you find in favor of plaintiff under Instruction Number _
insert number of plaintiffs verdict directing instruction based on
negligence), and if you believe that:
First, (here describe the act or omissionwhichjustifies the submission
of punitive damages), and
Second, defendant knew or had information from which defendant, in
the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that such
conduct created a high degree of probability of injury, and
Third, defendant thereby showed complete indifference to or conscious
disregard for the safety of others,
then in addition to any damages to which you find plaintiff entitled under
(here insert number of plaintffs damage
Instruction Number
instruction) you may award plaintiff an additional amount as punitive
damages in such sum as you believe will serve to punish defendant and to
deter defendant and others from like conduct.
MissouRi APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10.07 [1991 New] (Stephan H. Ringkamp
ed., 4th ed. 1991).
80. Sharp v. Robberson, 495 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Mo. 1973) (citing MAI 10.02).
81. Reel v. Consolidated nv. Co., 236 S.W. 43 (Mo. 1921).
82. Sharp, 495 S.W.2d at 397.
-

-
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damages based upon ordinary negligence, and in addition, if the evidence
supported the submission, to allow the award of punitive damages.'
The court indicated there are situations where a base set of facts support
a finding of negligence and additional facts support an award of punitive
damages. These additional facts, though, do not go so far as to support a
claim of an intentional tort.' The court cautioned that its opinion "is not to
be construed as relaxing the criteria for the award of punitive damages which
were required by the substantive law of Missouri prior to this case, and a
punitive-damages instruction must not be given unless the evidence in the case
supports punitive damages under the existing substantive law."'
Thus, where a defendant's conduct showed complete indifference to or
conscious disregard for the safety of others, a plaintiff need not elect between
negligence and intentional tort, but he or she may submit and recover actual
damages under the negligence submission and punitive damages under the
punitive damages submission.86
The court then defined complete indifference to or conscious disregard
for the rights of others with respect to punitive damages to be when the actor
(1) intentionally acts or fails to act, and (2) he knows or has reason to know
his conduct (i) creates an unreasonable risk of harm, (ii) involving a high
degree of probability (iii) resulting in substantial harm.'
The cases following Sharp attempted to more clearly define situations
where negligence and punitive damages are compatible. The particular
situation to which Sharp is addressed is necessarily a factual one. Thus, the
courts were left to decide whether their specific fact situations fall within the
confines of the situation described by Sharp. However, courts have been
cautioned that punitive damages are to be the exception rather than the rule."
While Sharp did not require a plaintiff to choose between allegations
sufficient for punitive damages and allegations sufficient for negligence, 9 it
did authorize a plaintiff to sue on a negligence theory and then prove an
intentional tort in order to win punitive damages. This is a situation where the
state of mind proven was too much to fall within the situation carved out by
Sharp. For example, in Fordv. Politte,9 ° a police officer was kicked by a
prisoner. The officer sued on a negligence theory and asked for punitive

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 399.
86. Id. at 395-96.
87. Id. at 398.
88. Litchfield v. May Dept Stores Co., 845 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); Menaughv. Resler Optometry, Inc., 799 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Mo. 1990).
89. Sharp, 495 S.W.2d at 399.
90. 618 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/6
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damages. Since all the evidence pointed to the fact that the kick was
intentional, the court held that a submission on the theory of negligence was
not justified by evidence of an intentional act-the two are inconsistent and
mutually exclusive.91 The officer received neither compensatory nor punitive
damages.'

On the other end of the continuum is the situation where a plaintiff shows
enough evidence to support his negligence allegation but fails to show enough
The following cases exemplify
culpability to warrant punitive damages.'
this situation: Litchfield v. May Department Stores Co.94 and Hoover's
Dairy,Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen,Inc.95
In Litchfield, a child was injured when a furniture display fell on him.
"Two days before the plaintiff was injured, another child had been hurt at the
same store when a similar piece of display furniture [had fallen] on him."
Defendant's manager directed an employee to secure the furniture, but it had
not been done.96 The defendant's manager testified that this had been a
recurring problem at the store and had been discussed in 75% of the monthly
safety meetingsY
He also testified that safety measures had been
implemented. 98 The court held that this evidence was insufficient to show
that the defendant knew or had reason to know that its conduct was
"substantially likely" to cause harm.'
The court reasoned that since defendant had taken measures to address
this safety problem, although this in itself may not always insulate a defendant
from punitive damages, defendant's failure to secure the display was not the
Rather, this
result of complete indifference or conscious disregard.'
constituted mere ordinary negligence.10
In Hoover'sDairy,plaintiff purchased an electrical milking machine. It

was installed negligently resulting in the emission of "stray voltage" from the
system giving plaintiff's cattle a disease called mastitis from which several

91. Id. at 46; See also Miller v. Kruetz, 643 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
92. Ford,618 S.W.2d at 46.
93. Johnsonv. Cowell Steel Structures, Inc., 991 F.2d 474, 478 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that "punitive damages may be recovered in a negligence action when the
plaintiff presents evidence of sufficiently egregious conduct").
94. 845 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
95. 700 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1985).
96. Litchfield, 845 S.W.2d at 599.
97. Id. at 600.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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died."°
The agents of defendant who installed' the equipment were illtrained and did not check for any "stray voltage."'
The court concluded that there had been insufficient evidence to show
that defendant knew or had reason to know that leaving ill-trained personnel
to finish the installation or failure to check for "stray voltage" created an
unreasonable risk with a high probability that a substantial injury would
occur.'
The court emphasized that nothing indicated that defendant knew
or had reason to know that there was "stray voltage" in the barn.' ° It
likened this to a case where a mechanic failed to test the brakes on a car.
Assuming that the examination of the brakes should have been conducted, the
court analogized, the mechanic is negligent but not liable for punitive damages
unless it can be shown that he or she knew or had reason to know that the
brakes were in fact faulty, and thus a substantial likelihood existed that the
brakes would fail and result in great harm."0 6 This shows the required
scienter for punitive damages beyond the scienter required for negligence.
However, in dicta, this court did note that the required scienter can be
shown in other instructions beside the punitive damage instruction."°
There have been several cases where the evidence fit the Sharp situation
and punitive damages were awarded in a negligence action. Each case follows
very closely the elements listed in Sharp.'
In Smith v. Courter,:°
defendant-doctor failed to check X-rays of his patient before operating. The
court found that defendant knew or should have known that there was a high
degree of probability that substantial harm would result."'
In O'Brien v. B.L.C.," the defendant-insurance company sold a
salvaged car at double the market price to a person who knew it was salvaged.
However, the defendant failed to title the car as salvaged as required by

102. Hoover's Dairy,700 S.W.2d at 430.
103. Id. at 429.
104. Id. at 436.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 437.
108. See Sharp, 495 S.W.2d at 398. The actor (1) intentionally acts or fails to
act, and (2) he knows or has reason to know his conduct (i) creates an unreasonable
risk of harm, (ii) involving a high degree of probability (iii) that substantial harm will
result. Id.
1109. 575 S.W.2d 199 (Mo.Ct. App. 1978).
110. Id.at 207. Similarly, inArana v. Koerner,the court found that the issue of
punitive damages should be submitted where a jury could reasonably find that
defendants knew an "improper" settlement of a lawsuitwould result in substantial harm
to plaintiff. Arana v. Koemer, 735 S.W.2d 729, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
111. 768 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1989).
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statute. Plaintiff subsequently bought the car from the third person."' The
court found that defendant-insurance company knew or had reason to know
the subsequent
transaction would likely occur and that substantial harm would
113
occur.

IV. INSTANT DECISIONS

A. Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative [Haynam 1]
The Supreme Court's order to remand"' pertains to the issue of
punitive damages in two respects: (1) the court held that a plaintiff seeking
recovery for wrongful termination of electrical service can be shown on a
theory of negligence" 5 and (2) the Haynams made a submissible case to
merit punitive damages. 6
As to the first point, the court did not elaborate on its finding, nor were

any citations given." 7

As mentioned earlier, in a footnote the court

suggested the Haynams may seek to submit their claim for actual damages on
retrial based upon negligence."'
When deciding the second point, the court, in view of the Burnett" 9
standard, noted the pertinent facts: the electricity would not be turned off
without a personal visit from Laclede; Sandra Haynam testified that Laclede
agreed that the Haynams had until the end of May to remit the final payment;
a very unfriendly conversation between Sandra Haynam and Laclede followed
the disconnection; 12 ° and the electricity was disconnected on May 22.12

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Haynam v. Laclede Elec. Coop, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 200, 208 (Mo. 1992).
115. Id. at 203-04.
116. Id. at 204.
117. Id. at 203-04.
118. Id. at 204.
119. Id. The "Burnett standard" to which the court refers, was stated in Burnett
v. Griffith, a malicious prosecution and assault and battery case. Burnett v. Griffith,
769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989). The court reviewed the status of punitive damages
as it pertained to assault and battery. Id. at 789. The court found MAI 10.01
applicable and that it included the requirement of a willful, wanton or malicious
culpable mental state. Id.
120. Hayman, 827 S.W.2d at 204. The court noted that state of mind is a
continuing condition that may be proved by statements evidencing the state of mind
either before or following the relevant point in time. Id. (citing Cramptonv. Osbom,
201 S.W.2d 336, 340-41 (Mo. 1947)).
121. Haynam, 827 S.W.2d at 203-04.
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The court then reasoned that on this evidence a jury could have found that the
remainder of the bill was not due until the end of the month, but Laclede
nevertheless "intentionally terminated the electrical service."'2
B. Haynam v. Laclede Electric Cooperative,Inc. [Haynam IIJ
In Haynam f, the court of appeals addressed the issue of the Haynams'
award of punitive damages. On remand, the Haynams stated their cause of
action solely on negligence." Again, the evidence offered by the Haynams
was nearly identical as the evidence reviewed by the supreme court in Haynam
1.124

The court reasoned that since it was not necessary to show conduct in
addition to or different in kind than that conduct which shows negligence, 2 5
the Haynams had met their burden of presenting evidence of Laclede's
culpable mental state." 6
In finding the Haynams presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to
find this culpable mental state, the court relied on Desalme v. Union Elec.
Light & Power Co., a case with facts remarkably similar to Haynam I and
I. In De Saline, defendant-power company discontinued electrical service to
plaintiffs after one of its agents allegedly found a "jumper", a devi6e used to
prevent the registering of electrical current used, on plaintiffs' terminal." 8
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant discontinued electric service to them2without
9
just cause, and that the defendant acted wrongfully and maliciously.
The court prefaced its holding by stating that punitive damages may be
recovered when a defendant's act is wanton or malicious, not necessarily the
product of spite or ill will, but intentionally done without just cause or
excuse. 30 Nevertheless, the court therein affirmed the award of punitive

122.
123.
1994).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 205.
Haynam v. Laclede Elec. Coop., Inc., 1994 WL 96608, *1 (Mo. Ct. App.

Id. at *2.
Id. (citing Menaugh, 799 S.W.2d at 74).
Id. at *2 (citing Litchfield, 845 S.W.2d at 599).
102 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
Id. at 780.
Id. at 782.

130. Id. at 783. The DeSalme court made its decision before there was a clear
difference between punitive damages pertaining to intentional torts, with its different
kinds of malice, and with punitive damages pertaining to negligence. Also, recall this
decision was made when there were two lines of cases in Missouri--one allowing
punitive damages innegligence, and the other allowing punitive damages inintentional
tort cases only.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/6
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on the basis that defendant acted in "utter disregard" of plaintiffs'
damages
31

rights.
The Haynam H court found nothing in the case to support Laclede's
claim that De Saline was based on an intentional tort theory,"' and was
therefore dispositive.
C. ConcurringOpinion
In so doing, he
In Haynam , Judge Parrish reluctantly concurred.'
stated that the majority's legal analysis was "technically and legally
correct."'13' Although he did not agree that the evidence supported a
punitive damages award,'35 he offered additional reasoning as to why the
judgment should be affirmed. He observed that the evidence was essentially
the same in Haynam II as in Haynam 136 Therefore, since the Supreme
Court held in Haynam I that the evidence supported punitive damages when
the underlying cause of action was based on an intentional tort, the same
evidence will support punitive damages when the underlying cause of action
is based on negligence.' 37
V. COMMENT
The problem in this case lies not with evidence that is insufficient to
show the required scienter for punitive damages, but with evidence of scienter
supporting an intentional tort.
We must assume, as did the appellate court, that the jury, by its verdict
in favor of the Haynams, resolved the question of the final payment's due date
to be May 30.3' Thereby, Laclede knew or had reason to know that the
final payment was to be on May 30.
For the jury to find Laclede liable for both actual damages based on
negligence and punitive damages, it must have found that Laclede acted,
subsequently to the agreement, in one of two ways. First, if Laclede recorded
the final payment to be on May 16, as it alleged, 39 then Laclede acted
intentionally, knowing or having reason to know that it would subsequently

131. Id.

132. Haynam, 1994 WL 96608, at *6.
133. Id. at *9 (Parrish, J., concurring).
134. Id. at *10 (Parrish, J., concurring).

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *9.

139. Haynam, 827 S.W.2d at 202-03.
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rely on this recording, with there being a high probability that the electricity
would be discontinued resulting in substantial harm.
Second, if Laclede recorded the final payment on May 30 and
subsequently discontinued the electrical services without checking their
records, they would be negligent with conscious disregard to the Haynams'
rights in the same way as the doctor in Smith v. Courter,140 when he failed
to check his patient's x-rays before operating. 41
However, in Haynam 1, the Supreme Court held the same conduct made
a submissible case for punitive damages as set forth in Burnett.' Burnett
was an intentional tort case; therefore, the conduct of Laclede was not in
"conscious disregard" but was "reckless and wanton" the standard of conduct
required for punitives in an intentional tort. Relying on this and on the
holding in Ford,"' the Haynams could not recover under either their
negligence cause of action or on their punitive damages claim if they
submitted the same evidence in Haynam H as they submitted in Haynam I,
which they did.
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, in effect was requiring an award of
punitive damages if the Haynams chose to submit their cause of action on
retrial under a negligence theory. It was leaving it up to the trial court to
decide on remand if Laclede acted negligently, if the Haynams chose this
cause of action, or if Laclede acted intentionally, if the Haynams chose that
cause of action. The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported either
cause of action. If the facts supported a negligence cause of action then there
could be not the intentional conduct the court said supported punitive damages
in Haynam I. If the facts supported punitive damages in an intentional cause
of action, then there could be no negligence. However, the Supreme Court
held that the same set of facts supported both. This is why the concurrence
felt logically constrained to affirm.
This decision blurs the line dividing negligence and intentional tort as to
the awarding of punitive damages. It allows plaintiffs to submit evidence to
140. Smith, 575 S.W.2d 199.
141. Id. There are two other inferences that the jury could draw from the
evidence, but neither are consistent with their finding. The first one is if Laclede
recorded the final payment to be on May 16, but the recording resulted from mere
inadvertence, due to clerical error, for example. This would constitute only ordinary
negligence and not satisfy the requirements for punitive damages. See, e.g., Harzfeld's
Inc., 116 F. Supp. at 515.
The second inference is that Laclede did record the final payment to be due on
May30, andbefore discontinuing electrical services checkedtheirrecords. Thiswould
not be negligence, but, rather, would be an intentional tort. See, e.g., Ford, 618
S.W.2d at 46; Miller, 643 S.W.2d at 312.
142. Haynam, 827 S.W.2d at 204.
143. Ford,618 S.W.2d 43.
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show negligence and win, then submit additional evidence, sufficient to show
an intentional tort, and be awarded punitive damages. This was not the
situation contemplated in Sharp. Sharp posed the question of whether a
plaintiff must submit their evidence to support either negligence and receive
compensatory damages alone or to submit their evidence under an intentional
tort theory, thus having a greater burden and risking a negligence award, in
order to receive punitive damages."' However, the conduct contemplated
in Sharp was not intentional, but rather was conduct that showed a "complete
indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others."' 45
In so holding, the court has extended Sharp. It appears that plaintiffs
may safely forego the risk of alleging an intentional tort and plead negligence,
but still receive punitive damages under evidence of conduct constituting an
intentional tort. The narrow situation carved by Sharp has been widened to
the point that intentional conduct and negligent conduct are no longer separate
theories but are commingled as if evidence of the latter also proves the
former.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state of law concerning punitive damages in negligence actions is one
of confusion and contradiction. Some states have attempted to clarify this

problem by separating gross negligence from ordinary negligence.'46 Thus,
one could not plead ordinary negligence and satisfy the requirement for
punitive damages.
Judge Holstein has suggested that Missouri adopt a higher evidentiary
standard for punitive damages. 47 While this was aimed at awarding
punitive damages when there is no justification other than a defendant having
"deep pocket[s]," it would also be helpful to courts in discerning between
conduct of conscious disregard and conduct that is, in fact, intentional.
KEVIN L. AusTum

144. Sharp v. Robberson, 495 S.W.2d 394, 395-96 (Mo. 1973).
145. Id. at 396.
146. Larsonv. Massey-Ferguson, 328 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
147. Kansas Cityv. Keene Corp., 855 S.W.2d 360, 377 (Mo. 1993) (Holstein, J.,
concuning).
148. Id. at 376.
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